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Abstract 
In a world of increasing complexity and situational variety, business-to-business 
collaboration based on real time information pooling is thought to be central for 
optimization of the value creation process. The qualities of the Internet render 
possible a simultaneous exchange of information among an unlimited number of 
firms, causing both academics and practitioners to assert that inter-firm alliances 
based on the Internet will become increasingly important in economic life. This 
paper reports on an explorative study that focuses on the use of Internet technology 
in interorganizational cooperative relationships, and the consequences this may 
have for the use of trust as a governance mechanism. The findings indicate that 
trust-based governance to a large extent is dependent on the specific actors that are 
involved in the relationship, and the particular industry in which the companies 
operate. Further, while interorganizational trust was very important in the initial 
stages of Internet business, mainly because of a need for flexibility that allowed for 
adapting to unforeseen situations, our findings indicate that we now experience an 
evolution towards more formal control mechanisms as companies are getting more 
acquainted with the Internet as a medium for conducting inter-firm business 
transactions.   
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1.  Introduction 
Fierce competition in most industries is forcing organizations to search for new 
ways to improve product quality, customer service and operating efficiency to 
remain competitive. Organizations operate in dynamic and turbulent environments 
that require flexibility and fast responses to changing conditions (Ahuja & Carley, 
1998). Internet has accelerated the need to deliver products and services faster and 
to provide information instantly both to internal units and external business 
contacts. Consequently, the ability to adapt to new needs and demands from 
different groups of customers, suppliers, intermediaries and competitors, is of vital 
importance. Demanding customers are followed by a need for more flexible value 
chains, where each part can be changed or eliminated quickly and effectively. 
Optimization of the total value creation process is thus very difficult to maintain by 
a single firm. Consequently, the core competencies of organizations are likely to be 
limited to specific parts of the total value creation process; the complexity of 
organizational tasks caused by technological acceleration and rapid globalization of 
markets has made it increasingly difficult for firms to be competitive without 
combining forces with other organizations (Ariño & Torre, 1998).  
Advanced information and communication technology make interorganizational 
communication and collaboration possible with lower costs and greater flexibility 
than ever before. This may stimulate noteworthy changes in models of 
organizational behavior, and lay the foundation for the evolution of new 
organizational structures that challenges traditional thoughts regarding management 
and administration (Staples et al., 1998; Bryan & Fraser, 1999). That is, fast and 
cost effective opportunities for communication and exchange of data and 
information may cause companies to outsource activities they used to perform 
internally. In this way, products and services will to a larger extent be composed of 
a range of sub-products from specialized companies, which again necessitate an 
increase in focus on interorganizational coordination. As an example, the Internet-
based global provider of personal financial services, E*TRADE Group Inc., states 
that they by September 30 were engaged in business relations with 3,778 unique 
cooperating partners. Further, the company claims that they handle all of these 
relationships on an individual basis: «None of our associates are subject to 
collective bargaining agreements or represented by a union» (E*TRADE, SEC 
2000, pp. 33). This research seeks to enhance the understanding of potential impacts 
the Internet as a medium for coordination and communication may have on the 
governance of business relationships. More specifically, the objective is to examine 
the role of trust as a governance mechanism in Internet-based business 
relationships. 
Price, authority and trust are often regarded as the three major governance 
mechanisms used in organizing inter-firm transactions (see e.g. Bradach & Eccles, 
1989). Transactions are rarely governed solely by price, authority or trust, that is, 
elements of these mechanisms are generally used in different combinations 
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(Haugland & Reve, 1994) to govern interorganizational cooperative relationships 
[figure 1]. 
 
Figure 1:  Main Governance Mechanisms 
 
The reason for choosing trust as the governance mechanism in focus is twofold. 
First, in order to cope with new challenges in the global business environment, 
firms have begun to implement organizational innovations both internally and in 
their relations with other firms. Both the steep increase in the number and variety of 
exchange relations, and the increased complexity and uncertainty of the business 
environment are hard to handle without the presence of interorganizational trust. 
Second, more knowledge-intensive products and services, and more information-
based modes of production, necessitating more sharing of sensitive information, 
make trust a highly desirable property in new business environments (Sydow, 
1998). 
The paper is structured as follows: In chapter 2, theoretical model, we describe the 
concept of interorganizational relationships, trust-based governance, inter-firm 
consequences of electronic communication, and outline a future governance 
situation in electronically mediated business relations. The methodological 
approach is described in chapter 3. Chapter 4, analysis and discussion, contains an 
interpretation of the collected data in terms of various forms or components of 
social governance. Finally, in chapter 5, the results are summarized, and some 
limitations of the study are mentioned along with suggestions for future research.  
 
Interorganizational cooperative relationships 
Governance 
   Trust     Authority    Price 
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2.  Theoretical Model 
2.1 Interorganizational Cooperative Relationships 
An interorganizational relationship occurs when two or more organizations transact 
resources [e.g. money, products or services] among each other (Van de Ven, 1976), 
and act in concert to pursue mutual gain (Combs & Ketchen, 1999). There are many 
different types of cooperation structures and alliances, yet no uniform 
understanding of how these forms are divided into typologies (Larsen, 1999). Jägers 
et al. (1998) use the concept of “network organizations” as a generic term that 
includes all arrangements involving cooperation between people or organizations. 
In order to differentiate between various types of cooperative arrangements, they 
use the concepts “control” and “uncertainty” to array the alternatives on a 
continuum of network organizations [figure 2].  
 
 
Figure 2: Continuum of Network Organizations1 (Jägers et al., 1998) 
                                                        
1 In this paper, the figure’s relevance is related to its axes (uncertainty and control), and not to the 
three different organizational types. That is, this paper applies a wide understanding of 
interorganizational cooperative arrangements and relationships, and the names of the different 
organizational forms described by Jägers et al. are not of any importance. However, they are 
included in order to illustrate and describe the effects that various positions along these two 
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According to Jägers et al., Planet-Satellite organizations are characterized by a high 
level of control because of clear and extensive contracts, and differences in the 
power structure. Generally, there are clear contracts in strategic alliances as well, 
but the relationship between the participants is to a larger extent based on principles 
of equality and reciprocity. Virtual organizations are almost solely marked by 
mutual dependence; the objective can only be reached by exploitation of each 
participant’s special knowledge and methods.      
 
2.2 Governance of Inter-firm Relations 
Administration and management of networked organizational arrangements are 
mainly a matter of coordinating joint activities and establishing guidelines for 
interaction, and have been analyzed from different theoretical perspectives. 
Transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1985) focuses on market incentives and 
hierarchical mechanisms as alternative means of structuring buyer-seller 
relationships. The theory maintains the presumption that organizational variety 
arises primarily in the service of transaction cost economizing. It distinguishes 
between economic activities that should be accomplished by internal control and 
governance, activities that should be organized by market mechanisms, and 
activities that are best executed through different collaborative arrangements.  
In contrast to transaction cost theory’s suggestion that relational or intermediate 
forms of governance are maintained by economic weapons to keep opportunistic 
behavior at bay (Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995), relational contract theory 
emphasizes the importance of building personal trust relations, and thus addresses 
the behavioral or social dimensions of a relationship (Macaulay, 1963; Macneil, 
1980). This may be especially important in uncertain and complex situations that 
require flexibility from the participants. It is costly and difficult to make all 
potential conditions explicit in situations with these characteristics, and informal or 
social governance mechanisms, like trust, can therefore be effective.  
 
2.3 Social and Normative Governance: Trust 
Trust can be regarded as a generic term describing different social norms used as 
governance mechanisms in interorganizational relationships. In this sense, trust is a 
property of collective units that is used to describe the relations among groups of 
people rather than individual psychological states (Haugland & Reve, 1994). It can 
be defined as a set of expectations shared by the parties involved in an exchange 
process (Zucker, 1986), which alleviates the fear that one’s exchange partner will 
act opportunistically (Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Mahoney et al., 1994). Trust is the 
main governance mechanism in social contract theory (Zaheer & Venkatraman, 
1995), and is regarded as more appropriate in environments characterized by 
uncertainty and complexity, flat hierarchies and increasing specialization. With 
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detailed formal contracts, it is difficult and costly to make modifications 
(Nooteboom et al, 1997), hence trust can make interorganizational relations 
function more effectively by reducing complexity, and by fostering coordination 
and cooperation in ways that more formal contracts cannot (Zucker, 1986; Hill, 
1990; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Hardy et al., 1998). 
In an interorganizational context, Sako (1998) distinguishes between three types of 
trust:  
• Contractual trust refers to a belief in a partner’s willingness to carry out its 
contractual agreements.  
• Competence trust is related to the perception that a partner possesses the 
capabilities of doing what it is intending to do, and requires a shared 
understanding of professional conduct and technical and managerial standards.  
• Goodwill trust refers to the assumption that the partner will make an open-
ended commitment to take initiatives for mutual benefit while refraining from 
unfair advantage taking.  
 
In this study, contractual trust, competence trust, and goodwill trust, including 
different social norms and shared values, are all included in the measurement of the 
trust concept. Hence, trust refers to aspects like the business’ preferences regarding 
details of, and reliance on written business contracts [contractual trust], the 
appreciation and perceived value of advice from business partners and confidence 
in the partners’ job qualifications [competence trust], and the reliance of partners to 
be helpful although such efforts are not required by the existing agreements 
[goodwill trust]. Further, trust relates to the degree to which the business 
relationship is perceived to be valuable and worth maintaining for both economic 
and social reasons [contractual solidarity], and the extent to which the parties in a 
relationship believe that the relationships will work as a foundation for future 
conflict solving in stead of neutral third parties or lawsuits [relational conflict 
solving]. 
 
2.4 Internet-based Inter-firm Cooperation: Implications for 
Information Exchange 
New applications, new users, and faster connections have spurred the Internet to 
become an important medium for business-to-business communication. According 
to Evans & Wurster (2000), the rapid growth of the Internet is the catalyst of 
comprehensive industry structure alterations. Traditionally, business strategy has 
focused on either "rich" information; customized products and services tailored to a 
niche audience, or it has reached out to a larger market, but with watered-down 
information that sacrificed richness in favor of a broad, general appeal. Now, this 
fundamental tradeoff between richness and reach is diminishing. In this way, the 
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Internet changes the nature of competition as well as firms’ strategic and 
competitive advantages, and is likely to alter the environment in which enterprises 
operate as it both simplifies and creates new possibilities for interorganizational 
communication. 
On the basis of organizations’ constant increase in the need for flexibility and rapid 
adjustment of products and services (Ahuja & Carley, 1998), many authors argue 
that increasing use of the Internet in business-to-business communication have 
engendered new forms of organizations, such as “networks”, “virtual 
organizations”, and “value added partnerships”. With reference to Jägers et al. 
(1998) [figure 2], the consequence may be that the cooperative alliances of the 
future will be characterized by low control and high uncertainty. 
 
2.5 Uncertainty 
New and complex projects are likely to be characterized by absence of relevant 
information at the time contracts are settled; thus business deals cannot be fully 
specified or controlled by the parties in advance of their execution (Ring & Van de 
Ven, 1994). Further, cooperative environments characterized by complex tasks and 
comprehensive demands, makes it both complicated and expensive to develop rules 
and guidelines of how to handle different situations. Consequently, the involved 
enterprises encounter uncertainty regarding future states. According to Jägers et al. 
(1998), uncertainty and lack of control are mainly caused by absence of 
information, which implies that situations involving relatively unfamiliar and high-
risk tasks require flexible networks where pooling of knowledge and information is 
done on a regular basis. As personal and informal bonds between the participants 
simplify sharing of both explicit and implicit knowledge, personal relations based 
on trust may be of fundamental importance in establishing and managing business 
relationships in uncertain environments. 
 
2.6 Control 
Jägers et al. (1998) assert that the level of control in a network organization is 
determined by the characteristics and extent of the contracts that exist. However, as 
the concept control is often associated with managers’ abilities to achieve desired 
working behavior from employees (Yates, 1989), contracts and formal guidelines 
for cooperation are alternative means to achieve control in or between 
organizations. In contrast, the normative control literature focuses on the roles of a 
common organizational culture, values, and trust as effective substitutes for less 
bureaucratic control (Gargiulo, 1999).  
On this basis, the anticipated evolution of interorganizational cooperative 
relationships regarding the control and uncertainty dimensions presented in the 
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previous discussion, are illustrated in figure 3. This model, which is based on figure 
2, shows a continuum of network organizations where different organizational 
forms can be placed along the dimensions of control and uncertainty. In our model, 




Figure 3:  Anticipated Effects of Increasing Use of the Internet 
 
As already pointed out, cooperative relationships in the digital economy are 
characterized by uncertainty as to future conditions, necessitating flexibility and 
informal relations between the participants. Hence, it can be argued that increasing 
levels of information exchange between the participating organizations in an 
interorganizational cooperative relationship, will be accompanied by increasing 
emphasis on social or normative governance mechanisms in the relationship [as 
illustrated in figure 3]. This leads to the following assumption: Increasing use of the 
Internet as a channel for information exchange in an interorganizational 
relationship, should lead to higher levels/increasing use of social governance 
mechanisms [indicated by the hierarchically arranged forms of trust – contractual 
trust, competence trust, and goodwill trust - and the degree of contractual solidarity 
and relational conflict solving] in this relationship.  The goal of the research is to 
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3.  Methodology 
3.1 Research Approach 
Because little is known about the connection between extensive Internet use and 
governance of inter-firm relations, an explorative research approach was chosen. 
This explorative goal of the research, together with the specific focus on inter-firm 
relationships, dictated the use of key informant interviews [global approach] over 
more quantitative and extensive approaches to inquiry. As a composite measure 
would have required a vast amount of respondents in order to demonstrate that the 
measure in fact is attributable to processes on an organizational level, a global 
approach was chosen. The data collection strategy was to collect as much 
background information as possible through desk-based research in order to allow 
the informant interviews to concentrate on collecting in-depth information on the 
practices and experiences of the chosen research objects. Data concerning the 
research question were obtained through interviews with the top managers in the 
organizations, and the interviews were conducted by telephone in a semi-structured 
format based on a pre-developed interview guide. All interviews were taped. The 
interviews were designed to yield information related to various aspects of inter-
firm relations, and the informants were allowed to read the interview guide in 
advance of the interview. Edited transcripts2 of the taped interviews were prepared, 
and served as the database for the study. In addition, minor parts of the information 
used in the discussion were found on the companies’ websites. 
3.2 Empirical Setting 
Because of the type of information needed, that is, in-depth and detailed 
information relevant to a relatively wide problem area, interviews with only a small 
number of informants could be carried out. Further, the informants had to be 
acquainted with the Internet as a medium for communication on both organizational 
and industry levels, and it was therefore important to single out technology-
intensive companies operating in industries that are highly visible in the digital 
economy. On the basis of these factors, two Internet-based companies from the 
Norwegian travel industry [GoToGate AS and Reisefeber AS3], and two online 
companies operating in the Norwegian financial services industry [E*TRADE 
Norge ASA and Stocknet-Aston Securities ASA4] were chosen as the empirical 
setting for the study. 
                                                        
2 Most of the transcripts are verbatim. However, the parts where the informants’ wordings were 
incomplete are edited.  
3 www.GoToGate.no and www.Reisefeber.no  
4 www.ETRADE.no and www.Stocknet.no 
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4.  Analysis and Discussion 
4.1 Internet Technology and Information Exchange 
The information gathered from the business cases indicate that collaboration with 
multiple players outside the firm based on real time information pooling is a central 
aspect of digital economy business. As an example, the CEO of E*TRADE asserts 
that they have several thousand distinct cooperative relationships5. Of course, the 
level of technological integration in these relationships depends on the motives 
underlying the relationships. Even though Internet technology potentially simplifies 
activities like marketing and advertising, the importance of the technology is mainly 
related to the effectuation of stock trading in the financial services industry [for 
stockbrokers] and travel bookings in the traveling industry. Thus, all four 
companies seek to optimize their main business operations, and one of the primary 
means for the enterprises to achieve this operational efficiency is through 
technological integration of their business processes. Technological integration 
helps the companies eliminate process inefficiencies, which is clearly reflected in 
the objectives and the certificates of warranty that the online stockbrokers in this 
study give to their customers. These announcements are published on the websites 
of E*TRADE and Stocknet respectively [translated from Norwegian]: 
 
“E*TRADE is the only online brokerage company in Norway where you can 
place your share-purchases directly into the trading systems of the Oslo 
Stock Exchange. This means that there aren’t any manual intermediaries 
between your share purchase/placements and the stock exchange. This is 
particularly important when the stock exchange is running; an intermediary 
can result in a long delay in the purchasing process.” 
“Stocknet guarantees that all orders received through our Internet system 
will be forwarded to Oslo Stock Exchange within 60 seconds from the order 
is received. Normally, your purchasing order reaches the stock exchange 
within 5 seconds. If we don’t meet this deadline, Stocknet doesn’t charge any 
brokerage commissions for this particular order.” 
 
Like E*TRADE and Stocknet, both online travel agencies [Reisefeber and 
GoToGate] base their day-to-day business on the Internet. They receive orders from 
their customers via their websites, and handle these orders by transmitting them to 
the various suppliers’ online booking services. 
 
                                                        
5 See page 2, paragraph 2. 
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4.2 Uncertainty and Control in Electronic Mediated 
Ccooperation 
Some important business activities of the actors in the travel and financial services 
industries are to a large extent governed by clearly defined rules and regulations. As 
an example, all travel agencies have to be registered as an IATA-bureau6 in order to 
book airline tickets. The booking process is also regulated by unalterable rules 
regarding time of departure and name of the traveler. There are specific time-
periods for making changes to the reservations, and acceptable travel guarantees are 
needed in order to complete the bookings. The use of control mechanisms in the 
relationships between travel agencies and airlines is therefore independent of the 
agencies’ use of the Internet in their business processes. The relationships between 
suppliers of travel products [especially airline tickets] are therefore mainly 
governed by formal control mechanisms, and the level of uncertainty is relatively 
low. 
Similar rules and regulations can be found in the financial services industry. That is, 
the stockbrokers have to accept the standardized agreements offered by the Oslo 
Stock Exchange, The Norwegian Central Securities Depository, and the Bank of 
Norway. The stockbrokers are fully dependent on these agreements in order to 
accomplish their business processes. Thus, formal control mechanisms and low 
levels of uncertainty characterize these relationships. 
Generally, cooperative agreements that involve exchange of goods and/or money 
are relatively standardized in both industries involved in this study. This is 
especially true regarding the companies’ relations with content suppliers, illustrated 
by the following statements7. 
 
“In the travel industry, the agreements are standardized [regarding length 
and content]. Often, we have one-year agreements, and if their duration is 
longer than one year, it is usually possible to renegotiate and change the 
content of the agreements.”   
[CEO – GoToGate] 
 
“Agreements that exist in the financial services industry are regulated, i.e. 
clear and detailed contracts. With strategically important content suppliers, 
we generally have long-lasting contracts.”  
[CEO – E*TRADE Norge]  
 
                                                        
6 IATA – International Air Transport Association.  
7 All statements by the informants used in this paper are translated from Norwegian. 
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“Oslo Stock Exchange, The Norwegian Central Securities Depository, The 
Banking, Insurance and Securities Commission of Norway, and Norway’s 
clearing house are not very flexible. They have to manage a lot of customers, 
and we are one of many actors that have to behave according to standard 
procedures.” 
[CEO – Stocknet] 
 
“The agreements are not flexible. Our suppliers are not flexible because they 
have relations with a great many travel agencies and other actors in the 
traveling industry. Thus, the contracts have to be standardized.” 
[CEO – Reisefeber] 
 
The most common agreements in the travel industry are one-year, contract-based 
framework agreements. All written agreements that GoToGate are involved in are 
based on a pre-developed framework. All agreements are evaluated continuously, 
and it is simple to make changes. That is, the framework that underlies most 
agreements proposes some intentions for the cooperation, and it is possible to make 
adjustments within this framework at any time. The cooperative activities are often 
settled for short time periods [4-6 months], which is the case for all supplier 
agreements that GoToGate has. In addition to these supplier relations, the company 
has agreements that are not characterized by standardized procedures. Some 
relationships are less fixed and involve mutual exchange of information. These 
agreements do not contain any economic commitments or conditions for any of the 
parties. Generally, GoToGate offers information and services that the partners need, 
which again may generate customers to their website. Because these relations do 
not involve any exchange of money or goods, the contracts are more informal.  
In addition to the agreements with suppliers of financial products and services [e.g. 
Oslo Stock Exchange, The Norwegian Central Securities Depository, etc.], Stocknet 
perceives their relations to suppliers of information technology [Aston Technology] 
and their Internet Services Provider [NetPower] to be critical for their existence. 
However, in contrast to the formal and strictly regulated relations with the first 
mentioned supplier group, the relations with Aston Technology and NetPower are 
more or less based on informal control procedures.  
“The relationship with Aston Technology is critical. It is important to us that 
they do their job, and we are very satisfied with the company. This business 
relationship is more like a partnership. [...] They do anything to please us.” 
“Regarding our relationships with Aston Technology and NetPower, we 
never bring out the contract to appreciate the text. We always do what is 
most appropriate and serviceable for both parties, and these agreements are 
therefore very flexible with regard to practical execution. We do not live up 
to the agreements point by point.”     
[CEO – Stocknet] 
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The CEO of Reisefeber claims that the flexibility and duration of agreements differ 
with regard to company type. A body of rules and regulations dictate the 
administration of relations with major suppliers [e.g. airlines]. In contrast, 
Reisefeber has initiated cooperate relationships with other companies, which are 
governed by other means than the airline relationships are. Generally, these 
companies offer products and services that are not fundamental to Reisefeber, but 
may be valuable as complementary services to the customers, or the relationships 
may attract customers to Reisefeber’s website. 
“We have a verbal agreement with Bilguiden. […] This agreement is based 
on a desire to help each other, we are not competitors in any ways, and we 
swap commercial ads as long as there is free advertising space on our 
websites. […] This agreement is very flexible; both companies are allowed to 
sell the advertising space to other companies without considering contract-
based regulations.” 
[CEO – Reisefeber] 
 
Further, the CEO of Reisefeber asserts that there are differences in flexibility 
between agreements that the involved parties have experience with, and agreements 
that are new and involve aspects that the parties are unacquainted with. In novel 
situations, it is common to practice some flexibility, as the companies have to get to 
know each other and the new market opportunities that may emerge. Reisefeber 
also experiences that their relations with online actors are more flexible and less 
specific compared to their relationships with “traditional” companies.     
 
4.3 Governance Implications: The Role of Trust in Electronic 
Environments 
4.4 Contractual Trust 
A general opinion held by the informants is that governance of cooperative 
arrangements involving exchange of money and products/services has to be based 
on clearly defined contracts, and such relations are therefore more often regulated 
by detailed contracts than are other types of business relationships. Only one of the 
four informants in this study reported that they have experienced problems with a 
partner regarding fulfillment of the existing contract. This indicates that contractual 
trust is a common aspect of the cooperative relationships. Further, it is common to 
make long-term contracts with strategically important suppliers. This implies that 
the companies trust the partners to carry out the written agreements, which again 
indicates that contractual trust is an important aspect of relations with strategic 
partners. 
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According to the CEO of Reisefeber, there are major differences between their 
relationships with online companies and their relations with “traditional” companies 
regarding emphasis on the contractual document. Traditional companies are 
generally more skeptical to initiating a cooperative relationship with an Internet-
based company. 
“ […] traditional companies are generally more skeptical. This has changed 
a bit lately, but they still regard it as important to provide for one’s own 
economic safety by use of clear contracts in case we go bankrupt.” 
[CEO – Reisefeber] 
 
4.5 Competence Trust 
Competence trust refers to a company’s perception of whether a partner is capable 
of performing the activities that it is responsible for according to the cooperative 
agreement. All informants claim that it is important to be well informed about the 
potential partners before entering into agreements. This is particularly true for 
companies that do not have a strong brand name. The reason for this is that 
companies without a brand name of their own often are associated with well-known 
partners, and branding is therefore often a central motive for online companies to 
initiate cooperative relationships. The primary condition underlying such a 
relationship is a belief that the partner’s products and services are of good quality. 
In other words, this type of branding presupposes competence trust.  
 
“Usually our suppliers have much stronger brand names then we do, which 
means that we often get associated with them. Thus, if a supplier doesn’t 
deliver high-quality products, and doesn’t take care of the customers, this 
will have bad influence on the customers’ perception of us.” 
[CEO – Reisefeber] 
 
According to the CEO of Reisefeber, they often make demands regarding use of 
technology in business relationships. However, the most typical situation is that 
Reisefeber organizes and develops the technological solutions, and then receives 
database information from the cooperating parties. Typically, Reisefeber operates 
and administers the entire technological applications. Sako (1998) asserts that one 
mechanism for creating informal commitment, is for the customer to provide 
technical assistance to a supplier. To the extent that the customer demonstrates 
knowledge and skills by providing technical assistance, it enhances suppliers’ 
competence trust of the customer. Thus, arrangements where Reisefeber is in charge 
of all technological issues are likely to include some degree of competence trust.  
In addition, transfer of database information per ce indicates trust in the 
relationship. Sharing of information facilitates cooperation of organizations, and it 
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is argued that provision of information by either of the parties has a significant 
effect of enhancing trust and reducing opportunism (Sako, 1998). In other words, 
the types of information exchange in which Reisefeber is involved, are to some 
extent based on normative control mechanisms.     
 
4.6 Goodwill Trust 
Goodwill trust is defined as the assumption that the partner will make an open-
ended commitment to take initiatives for mutual benefits while refraining from 
unfair advantage taking. With this specific type of trust in mind, the informants 
were asked whether they relied on their partners to always be helpful even though 
they were not required to by the existing contractual agreements. Our travel 
industry informants would expect the majority of their partners to be supportive and 
helpful in unexpected and problematic situations.  
 
“Our experience shows that we always find solutions to problems that aren’t 
specified in the agreements. […].  This is what cooperation is all about.” 
[CEO – GoToGate] 
 
“Generally, our business partners are absolutely helpful although they don’t 
have to according to the contract. […] We see most of our partners as 
relatively flexible in this area, and believe that they always want to make the 
best out of unpredicted situations and problems, regardless of the contract 
terms.” 
[CEO – Reisefeber] 
 
One informant emphasized that it is of crucial importance that all parties perceive 
the cooperative relationships to be valuable. Further, as all agreements are based on 
a framework, the benefits and advantages for both parties are always dependent on 
interpretation of the contractual agreements. Most of the agreements that GoToGate 
are involved in have to be specified during the contract period, and this 
specification process is based on an expectation of mutual benefits. It is therefore 
safe to assume that some extent of goodwill trust has to be present for these 
framework agreements to work properly. 
The CEO of Reisefeber claims that most of their partners are flexible regarding the 
contract texts and generally wish to make the best out of problematic situations. 
However, there are major differences between partners regarding their willingness 
to be helpful in situations beyond the contractual agreements. Generally, online 
companies with whom Reisefeber cooperates, have more knowledge of the 
company and are thus more familiar with the problems and challenges that 
Reisefeber is faced with. Moreover, online companies have a common goal of 
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establishing a well-functioning Internet market. Online companies are therefore 
more helpful than traditional companies, and Reisefeber perceives the level of 
goodwill trust between companies that base their existence on the Internet to be 
larger than relationships involving traditional companies. 
Generally speaking, the informants from the financial services industry were more 
reserved regarding extraordinary or additional services from their business partners.  
“E*TRADE doesn’t expect the partners to be helpful. However, if we have a 
good relation to a partner, this partner may be willing to be more flexible 
than if the relationship was poor.” 
[CEO – E*TRADE Norge] 
 
“NetPower is always helpful in problematic and unexpected situations even 
though they don’t have to according to the existing agreements. Similarly, 
Aston Technology works 24 hours a day for us if it is necessary. […] I 
believe that DnB would have been accommodating if we needed them to, but 
when it comes to the rest of our partners, I would say no.” 
[CEO – Stocknet] 
 
These observations indicate that the total level of goodwill trust is larger in the 
travel industry than in the financial services industry. However, the CEO of 
E*TRADE asserts that they have a few cooperative agreements in which the 
relationships are more important than the contracts. As an example, their relation 
with The Norwegian Shareholders Organization is based on a written contract, but 
the relationship is mainly governed by a common or mutual understanding. They 
agree upon goals but the means are settled as the collaboration proceeds. Because 
the cooperative activities are determined on the basis of the relationship, the CEO 
of E*TRADE holds that they are willing to make adjustments in order to preserve 
the relation, thus not focusing solely on economic benefits.  
 
4.7 Contractual Solidarity 
Contractual solidarity refers to the desire of both parties to preserve the relation for 
both economic and social reasons. Statements from the informants indicate that this 
particular aspect of interorganizational trust is important in many business 
relationships. This is especially true for the travel industry companies. The CEO of 
GoToGate asserts that personal relations are very important to make the agreements 
work properly. Thus, qualities of the social relations are important aspects when 
companies are to decide whether they want to get involved in a technologically 
integrated cooperation with another company or not. 
Generally, business relationships in the financial services industry focus mainly on 
the economic elements. However, the CEO of E*TRADE argues that it is important 
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to preserve established personal relations. Therefore, they do not use personal 
relations as a basis for negotiations, as this may jeopardize the existing relations. 
This is especially true for the negotiation of the economic elements of the 
agreements. Instead, personal relations function as a basis for the selection of 
business partners. Thus, social relations are important for E*TRADE’s selection of 
partners but not for the negotiation process. 
The CEO of Stocknet argues that their business relations with suppliers of 
information systems and the Internet Services Provider (ISP) can be characterized 
more like partnerships than customer-supplier relations. The relationships are 
characterized by mutuality, flexibility, and helpfulness, which is more or less 
fundamental for the business affairs between the companies. It is therefore safe to 
assume that these relations are worth maintaining for both economic and social 
reasons.  
 
4.8 Relational Conflict Solving 
Relational conflict solving implies that the relationship between the cooperative 
companies is used as a basis for conflict solving, and the informants were asked 
whether they preferred to use the social relationships or the existing contracts as 
reference points for solving disputes. Three of the four informants claim that 
conflicts rarely occur. When a conflict situation once in a while occurs, all 
informants argue that they prefer to use the relationship as the basis for conflict 
solving instead of the judicial systems and/or neutral third parties. 
 
“Conflicts seldom arise. […] The formal parts of the contracts are hardly 
ever used to solve conflicts.”     
[CEO – GoToGate] 
 
“Conflicts hardly arise. However, in conflict situations, we try to use 
informal means to settle the dispute.”  
[CEO – Stocknet] 
 
These statements clearly indicate that conflict solving is handled through mutual 
understanding and personal relationships rather than through authority based 
structures. However, all informants state that Internet business has undergone some 
radical changes between April 2000 and April 2001. That is, cooperative 
agreements are now to a larger extent created through the use of legal assistance. As 
a result, the contracts are generally more detailed and specific regarding each 
party’s duties and tasks in the cooperative relationships, and there is less room for 
interpretation of the agreements. Further, conflict solving may also be easier as the 
contracts to a certain extent provide a basis for the conflict solving processes.  
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4.9 Recapitulation: Main Findings 
The preceding discussion can be synthesized in a couple of general or conclusive 
findings. First, the use of trust as a governance mechanism is largely dependent on 
the specific organizations that are involved in the relation. That is, flexibility, 
duration, and specification of content in the agreements vary with the specific 
companies that are involved in the relationships. Relations with companies that are 
easy to replace are generally more flexible than relations with actors that possess a 
fundamental position in the industry. Examples of these key actors are the Oslo 
Stock Exchange, The Norwegian Central Securities Depository, and The Banking, 
Insurance and Securities Commission of Norway in the financial services industry, 
and airlines in the travel industry. Detailed contracts and legal regulations of 
business activities reduce the uncertainty in the inter-firm relationships, which 
indicates that these relationships’ location in our model is unchanged [figure 4].  
 
Figure 4:  Uncertainty and Control in E-Mediated Cooperative Relationships 
Involving Irreplaceable Partners 
 
Second, there tends to be an overall evolution towards more formal control 
mechanisms and lower levels of uncertainty in business relations based on the 
Internet as a medium for communication and coordination. In contrast to business 
relations where large and irreplaceable partners are involved, relationships between 
companies that base their existence on information technology and the Internet can 
be placed closer to the normative end of the control axis. However, the Internet 
world has undergone major changes during the last year. Today, cooperative 
agreements are generally much more tangible and regulated by formal mechanisms 
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“[…] the way it worked 12 months ago is far from the methods and 
principles that are necessary for succeeding in the business life over long 
time periods. I believe that it is important to bring this knowledge into the 
future, but that we also work in more conventional ways. It is not either old 
economy or new economy but rather a change in the speed of traditional 
processes. I think that it is starting to reach a more realistic level, and that 
there are minor differences in cooperative agreements in the old versus the 
new economy. 12 months ago, there was a difference in that the agreements 
were less strict than they are now, and that they weren’t based on clearly 
defined strategies. Now people are becoming more levelheaded and think 
through the pros and cons of the cooperative relationships.” 
[CEO – GoToGate] 
 
“ […] one year ago, the agreements in the Internet world were extremely 
loose, particularly in Norway. Now the agreements have become more 
standardized, and they are to a larger extent founded on legal aspects. Thus, 
I think that cooperative relationships are more solid now than they were 
before. […] some agreements can be flexible, especially in new and unknown 
situations.”   
[CEO – Reisefeber] 
 
The statements listed above indicate that important aspects of Internet-based 
interorganizational cooperative relationships have undergone major changes since 
early 2000. Previously, cooperative relationships were characterized by vaguely 
defined contracts, informal relations, experimental activities, and the relations were 
to a large extent governed by informal control mechanisms. This situation has 
changed. Today, most businesses have become more experienced with the new 
communication environment, and they have acquired the skills and knowledge 
necessary for designing well-functioning agreements in the Internet world. As a 
consequence, today’s business relations are mainly governed by clearly defined 
contracts, and the involved parties generally know what the content of the 
agreements implies for their business. Thus, these results indicate that we have 
experienced an evolution of cooperative relationships in the digital economy as 
shown in figure 5.  
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Figure 5:  Evolution of Cooperative Relationships in Electronic Environments 
 
Generally speaking, uncertainty is reduced because business deals are more specific 
than before and activities are regulated by more formal rules and guidelines. 
However, it is important to notice that there are major differences between the 
various relationships that a company is involved in. Formal control mechanisms and 
a low level of uncertainty characterize relations involving companies that deliver 
unique products and services, as well as companies that are subject to strict 
regulations. In contrast, companies that do not deliver unique products and services 
have to emphasize relationship building in addition to product and service 
optimization in order to preserve a business relationship. The results also indicate 
that the level of goodwill trust is generally higher in relationships between online 
companies. In contrast, traditional companies are more reluctant to initiating 
business relationships with Internet-based companies and prefer to use clear and 
sound contracts. 
Our findings may indicate that flexibility is called for in the initial stages of 
unknown projects. The transformation to Internet business models implies major 
changes for many companies and, therefore, it is necessary to allow for continuous 
adjustments and adaptations. However, as companies get acquainted with the 
Internet, the need for flexibility is reduced, and other aspects of the business 
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5.  Conclusions 
Our research shows that management of inter-firm relations is intrinsically 
embedded in the particular industry standards and organizational culture of the 
participating firms. In addition, some findings can be drawn from the study. First, 
replacing partners in electronic environments is generally easy. Therefore, 
establishing and maintaining trust-based inter-firm relationships are more important 
for those companies that do not deliver unique products and services than for the 
companies that possess a monopoly position or are irreplaceable. Second, the results 
indicate that the digital economy has been in a phase of adjustments and learning. 
Uncertain and novel situations necessitate a need for continuous adaptation, which 
again require flexible business relations characterized by trust-based governance. 
However, as companies get acquainted with the Internet, they prefer to use more 
formal and cost-related mechanisms in a less uncertain environment.  
The theoretical and practical (managerial) contribution of the research can be 
summarized as follows: The data suggest that the use of particular governance 
mechanisms is partly dependent on the characteristics of the specific products and 
services that are exchanged in a business relationship. Therefore, it becomes 
important to consider the type of resources involved in an exchange process to 
explain the choice of mechanisms to govern the relations. Thus, the results 
underscore the need to augment research on social governance mechanisms with a 
rationale from theories that involve a focus on the resources exchanged in business-
to-business relationships.  
The limitations of this study include: First, the research reported draws on a very 
small purposive sample of online companies. Thus, questions of generalizability 
remain. Second, we used only one informant from each company to report on their 
dyadic business relationships. As the perceptions of relationship characteristics 
apparently are highly subjective, the quality of the study would probably have 
benefited from using several informants. Further, it is important to make clear that 
any interpretation of the qualitative data is subjective, and that the reliability and 
validity of the findings should therefore be questioned. 
There are several ways this research could have been pursued further. First, 
applying an evolutionary perspective seems to be crucial. As the results indicated 
that major changes have occurred during the last year, a wider time frame of 
research in this particular problem area may allow for identification of some of the 
important developmental aspects of the situation. Second, by including both online 
companies and traditional companies from different sectors, it would have been 
possible to make comparisons with respect to governance mechanisms in use.  
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